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STATEl\1ENT OF JURISDICTION

This Courfsjurisdiction rests on U.C.A. § 78A-3-102(3)U) and U.C.A. § 78A-3102(4).
STATEl\1ENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSCE 1:

Did the Trial Com1 err in denying Higginson's 1'1otion for Summary
Judgment?

Standard of Re,iew: De 110vo. By definition, "a district court does not resolve
issues of fact at sununary judgmenr' therefore~ this Court "consider[s] the record
as a ,\·hole and review[s] the district com1~s grant of summary judgment de novo:
reciting all facts a_11d fair inferences nra,vn from the record in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party." Poteet v. W71ite, 2006 UT 63,

~

7, 147 P.3d

439.
Preservation for Appeal: R. at 460-462.
ISSUE 2:

Did the Trial Court eIT in granting the Morton Estate's Motion for
Summary Judgment?

Standard of Re,iew: De novo. Id.
Preservation for Appeal: R. at 460-462.
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STATEI\1:ENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs/Appellees Jacquelynn D. Carmichael and 1v1egan J. Moss, as personal
representatives of the Estate of James E. Morton ("Morton Estate"), commenced the
present action against Defendant/Appellant Kraig Higginson ("Higginson") for allegedly
breaching a promissory note. The Morton Estate added Defendant/Appellant Mark
Burdge ("Burdge") in its Amended Complaint based on the theory that Burdge was
Higginson's personal assistant who interfered ,,,ith Higginson's alleged obligation to
repay the promissory note. The Amended Complaint asserts six causes of action: (1)
breach of contract (the Demand Note), (2) promissory estoppel, (3) unjust enrichment,
(4) conversion, (5) fraud, and (6) tortious interference.
Forgoing discovery, the parties filed summary judgment motions against each
other. (R. at 97-98, 108-109). The Trial Court denied Higginson and Burdge's summary
judgment motion but granted the Morton Estate's summary judgment motion. Higginson
and Burdge now appeal the Trial Court's December 29, 2015 order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Higginson was friends with James E. Morton ("Morton") for many years. (R. at
276).
2. Higginson retained Morton as his personal attorney in a complex litigation matter
that lasted many years. At some point during the litigation, Morton told Higginson
he had cancer. (R. at 276-277).
3. At the time, Higginson was the CEO of Raser Teclmologies, Inc. ("Raser"), a
technology company. (R. at 277).
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4. Higginson ,,,.anted to help Mmion because of Morton's ill health, and because of
:Morton's concern about his personal finances and \\·hat would happen to his
family if the cancer was fatal. Id.
5. Accordingly, Higginson aITanged for Morton to join Raser·s board of directors.
Because of his ill health, Morton did not have many responsibilities and did not
perfonn many duties. Id.
6. Due to Higginson' s efforts, Mmion received 500,000 shares of Raser stock for
being on the Raser board. Id.
7. Shortly after :Morton received the Raser stock~ he resigned from the Raser board of
directors because his health V\·as deteriorating and he vv·as u...~able to serve as a
Raser board member. Id.
8. Morton eventually sold his Raser stock at roughly $10 to $20 per share, and thus
received between five to ten million dollars. Morton constantly thanked Higginson
for this ,vindfall, and told Higginson that if he could ever repay the favor he
would. Id.
9. Higginson was the single largest shareholder of Raser stock, with approximately
thirteen million shares (which at its high point was worth over $500 million).
Hmvever, Higginson was unable to sell his stock because he ,vas a Raser officer
and director and a major shareholder in Raser. Id.
I 0. In early 2006, Higginson was in a financial difficulty, so he asked :Morton for
help. On January 25, 2006, M01ion ,vired $491 ~000 to Higginson. Id. (R. at 101).

2
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11. Morton repeatedly told Higginson at the time that the $491,000 would not need to
be repaid because Morton was grateful for ,vhat Higginson had done for him with
the Raser stock. (R. at 277).

12. Higginson told Morton that if Higginson ever sold his vast holdings of Raser stock
and received a windfall where he would be "set for life/' at that point Higginson
vwuld repay Morton. Higginson thus agreed to repay 11orton contingent on
Higginson selling his Raser stock for a large profit. Id.
13. At that time Higginson' s Raser stock held great value and the future looked
promising for Raser. (R. at 277-278).
14. From time to time, Higginson and Morton would have conversations about how
things were going at Raser and whether Higginson would be able to sell his Raser
stock. (R. at 278).
15. Morton's personal life began to change drastically thereafter. He divorced his wife
and met somebody from his work whom he later married. He began to live a lavish
lifestyle and had other significant personal life problems. Id.
16. Higginson and Morton occasionally traded emails about the money. In a
December 14, 2006 email to Morton, Higginson stated that he needed "to get
'squared up' on the$ I O\:ve you. I haven't forgotten ... and you will get paid." At
the time of this email Higginson was worth approximately $500 million in Raser
stock value, and if Higginson had been able to sell his Raser stock he ,vould have
returned the money to Morton. Higginson felt Raser was on a positive track at the
time of this email. Id.
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17. In another email dated Ap1il 6~ 2008, Morton inquired about the"+/- $SOOK'' he
had "loaned [Higginson] a couple of years ago to close on [his] house." Id.

.
.s
i 8·. H.iggmson

1

, ema1'Id ate d Apn1
,\ ., 1~(\v~ ..:.'0(\8
•
repiy
v stated : ····,-.1-.·
1 u1ngs are gomg
great.

Should be able to get the stock up nicely soon, and get you paid back. You \Vere
truly a life saYer this past year. Thanks for the patience. I have asked Stan Kimball
to prepare a Note ... just in case I get run over by a bus ... you would get paid.'~
Higginson' s reply email is consistent \Vith their agreement that the money ,vould
only be repaid if Higginson ,\·as able to capitalize on a Raser windfall by selling
his stock. Id.
19. Higginson and Morton both hoped that Raser' s stock price would go "up nicely
soon" and that Higginson could sell his stock. Id.

20. However~ Raser was in a fairly constant decline thereafter and eventually filed for
bankruptcy. (R. at 279).

21. Morton became increasingly en-atic as his life changed and fell apart. Higginson
always made it clear to M011on in their conversations (and Morton agreed) that
Higginson \\rould not need to repay :Morton unless and until Higginson was able to
sell his Raser stock. These conversations started in 2006 and continued until
1\1orton passed away. Id.

22. In late 2008, :Morton told Higginson he was concerned about tax issues (i.e., gift
tax issues) with the money he had wired to Higginson. Morton asked Higginson to
sign a document "for tax purposes on1 y" and represented to Higginson that he
should ;'not \\'orry about it.'~ In reliance on ~1orton · s representations~ Higginson
4
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signed the Demand Note on December 31, 2008. Id.; see Demand Note attached in
the Appendix.
23. Higginson signed the Demand Note not only based on Morton's representations,
but also because Morton was Higginson' s personal attorney and Higginson trusted
Morton. (R. at 279).
24. Higginson sent Morton a copy of the Demand Note for Morton's tax purposes, but
Higginson never delivered the original Demand Note to Morton. Id.
25. Neither Higginson nor Morton intended the Demand Note to be enforceable. Id.
26. In May 2009, Morton passed away. (R. at 228).
27. Morton had a copy of the Demand Note in his files prior to his death in May 2009.
(R. at 134).
28. In conversations with the Morton Estate's representatives after Morton's death,
Higginson never stated he would pay the amount due under the Demand Note. On
the contrary, Higginson consistently refused to pay the Demand Note. (R. at 241242).
29. Higginson (through counsel) requested the Morton Estate present the original
Demand Note. (R. at 126). The Motion Estate was unable to present the original
Demand Note. Id.
30. On October 10, 2014, the Morton Estate filed the Complaint in this matter. (R. at
I). The Morton Estate filed an Amended Complaint adding Burdge as a defendant.
(R. at 55).

5
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31. Burdge \,ias not Higginson' s assistant but V\-'as a business associate of Raser and
worked for a time on Raser energy projects. Higginson was not pa..rty to the emails
between lviorton and Burdge. (R. at 279).

SUl\1!\1A.RY OF .A.RGUl\1:ENT
The Trial Court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the 1'-1orton
Estate~ and improperly denied summary judgment to Higginson and Burdge.
First, the Trial Court en-ed ,,,hen it rejected Higginson's non-issuance argument.
The Trial Court improperly disregarded the fact that Higginson never delivered the
original Demand Note to Morton. Higginson sent only a copy to Morton in reliance on
!\1orton's representation that Morton needed it for tax purt)OSes, not to enforce against
Higginson. Higginson thus never issued the Demand Note - a prerequisite under Utah
Commercial Code and related case law.
Second= the Trial Court erred when it rejected Higginson's non-presentment
argument. Because Higginson never delivered the original Demand Note to Morton, the
Morton Estate was unable to present the original Demand Note to Higginson for
payment. The t\vo prevailing presentment standards do not allow for presentment of a
copy of a note.
Finally, the Trial Comi improperly disregarded Higginson's statute of limitations
defense to the Morton Estate's remaining causes of action. The triggering event for the
Morton Estate's remaining causes of action was either the date 11orton \Vired the money
in question to Higginson (January 25, 2006), or the date Higginson executed the Demand
Note (December 31, 2008). Either \Vay, the 11orton Estate filed its original Complaint on
6
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October 10, 2014, well after the applicable statute of limitations on the Morton Estate's
remaining claims.
ARGUl\1:ENT

Courts grant summary judgment motions \\,.hen there are no disputed issues of fact.
U.R.C.P. 56(c). Conversely, if there is "any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of
fact, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing party [and] the court must
evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in
a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Bowen v. Riverton City,
656 P .2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). In response to a summary judgment motion, the
nonmoving party is only required to submit evidence "sufficient to raise a genuine issue
of fact." Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED ,VHEN IT RULED THE DEl\iAND NOTE
WAS ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE HIGGINSON NEVER ISSUED THE
ORIGINAL DEl\1.AND NOTE

In granting Morton Estate's :tvfotion for Summary Judgment and denying
Higginson's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Trial Court incorrectly and improperly
concluded Higginson issued the Demand Note to Morton.
A.

Higginson Never Issued the Original Demand Note to 1\1:orton

A fundamental requirement for a note to be valid and enforceable is that the maker
of the note must issue the instrument to the recipient, just as one must voluntarily hand
over a $20 bill to another to transfer O\vnership of the $20 bill. This requirement is
codified in U.C.A. § 70A-3-l 05(1 ), which defines "issue" as "the first delive,y of an
instrument by the maker or drawer ... for the purpose of giving rights on the instrument
7
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to any person." (Emphasis added). A maker~s non.issuance of a note is eYidence he does
not intend on "'giYing rights~' on the note.
In TTwrcher v..Merriam~ 240 P.2d 266, 270 l Utah 1952), the com1 stated the
common law· rule regarding deHYery of notes: '\~·here there is a note, bond, or other
written obligation eYidencing the debt, [] there must be a delivery of the instrument .... "
(Citations omitted). The court in Johnson v. Beickey, 228 P. 189 (Utah 1924) also
addressed delivery of negotiable instruments. The Johnson court explained the common
la\v rule \\·as ·that every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable
until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto ....., Id. at 191.
In Jones v. Phillips, 23 7 Ga. Ct. App. 24 (1999), the court applied Georgia's
1

identical version of U.C.A. § 70A-3-105. The maker in Jones signed a note and even
"testified that she intended to repay the note when she signed it," but the maker never
delivered the note. Id. at 25. The Jones court found the maker's "acknowledgment that
she signed the note does not necessarily entitle Jones to repayment on it," and concluded
"[d]elivery must be shmvn in order to recover on a note .... " Id. ''[O]nce the maker of a
promissory note admits having executed the note, production of the instrument entitles a
holder to the judgment sought m1Jess the maker establishes a defense:' Con1111onv, ea!th
1

Land Title Ins. Co. v ..Miller, 195 Ga. Ct. App. 830, 833 (1990).

In the present case~ Mo11on caused $491,000 to be wired to Higginson' s account
on January 25, 2006. Not until nearly three years later did Higginson sign the Demand
Note ( on December 31, 2008) relating to the $491,000 transfer. It is uncontroverted that
1

See O.C.G.A. § 11-3-105.
8
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just prior to Higginson signing the Demand Note, 1'1orton told Higginson that he was
concerned about tax issues related to the money he had \\,ired Higginson. Morton wanted
a document in his files so that if he was audited by the IRS he would not be assessed a
gift tax on the funds he transferred to Higginson. Morton understood he would not be
taxed on an outstanding debt. To alleviate these tax concerns, Morton asked Higginson to
sign a document "for tax purposes only'' and told Higginson he should "not worry about
it." The document in question was the Demand Note, which Higginson signed because
Morton was Higginson's personal attorney, Higginson trusted him, and Higginson was
essentially doing Morton a favor. However, Higginson intentionally never delivered the
original Demand Note to Morton but instead only sent a copy for Morton's tax
accountant's paperwork. Higginson did not deliver the original Demand Note because he
did not intend to be bound by it.
As stated above in Jon.es and Miller, the fact that Higginson signed the Demand
Note is insufficient to create a binding legal obligation without intentional delivery. As
stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson, a note must be delivered "for the purpose
of giving effect thereto." Johnson, 228 P. at 191. Referring to a written assignment, the
Johnson court further explained the intent requirement when it stated that delivery may

be actual or constructive "such as written evidence of the transfer intending thereby to
vest the thing itself in praesenti in the assignee .... " Id. (Emphasis added). Higginson's
intent is also required in the negotiable instruments chapter of Utah's Unifonn
Commercial Code, which states Higginson must deliver the instrument "for the purpose
of giving rights" on the Demand Note to M011on. U.C.A. § 70A-3-105(1).
9
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~

There was no such intent to deliver the Demand Nate in the present case.
Higginson~ s intent can be discerned from the uncontroverted facts. Morton did not even
ask for a note until nearly tlu·ee years after he wired the money to Higginson, and he only
asked for a note for tax purposes~ not repayment purposes. Higginson understood this and
thus did not deliver the original Demand Note to Mo11on. Further, Higginson and Jv1orton
had numerous conversations indicating that Higginson \vould repay :Morton conditioned
on tenns not found in the Demand Note. The Demand ?--J ote never became an issue until
M011011 died and his daughters~ as personal representati,·es of the :Morton Estate and
\Vithout knowledge of their father and Higginson· s extensive discussions on the money in
question, found a copy of the Demand Note and sought repayment of it despite its
norussuance.
The Trial Court completely ignored this intent requirement ("The provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code- Negotiable Instruments (Utah§§ 70A-3-101~ et seq.) are
not imposed on the Demand Note.'·). (R. at 384 (~14)). Because it is uncontroverted
Higginson never intended to issue the 01iginal Demand Note, a copy of the Demand Note
is not now enforceable. By ruling that the Demand Note \\·as enforceable, the Trial Court
erred and should be reversed.

B.

Higginson's Debt Obligation to ~1orton (and, by Association, Delivery
of the Demand Note) \\las Conditioned on Higginson Selling His Raser
Stock

~.\.nother basis for rendering a note inYalid and unenforceable occurs ,,,hen the note
is issued based on a condition precedent. In Hanson v. Greenleaf, 218 P. 969, 970 (Utah
1923 ), the court explained that a maker may challenge enforcement of a note if the note
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vi
was delivered "with a condition precedent without the performance of which the note
never became a binding and fixed obligation." In such a scenario, the note is said to show
a "conditional delivery." Id. If a conditional delivery is proven, the note does "not
become a binding obligation unless and until such conditions were performed." Id. at
971. This conditional delivery defense was codified in U.C.A.§ 70A-3-105(2), which
states, "An instrument that is conditionally issued or is issued for a special purpose is
binding on the maker or drawer, but failure of the condition or special purpose to be
fulfilled is a defense."
To prove a conditional delivery, the maker is allowed to introduce parol evidence
because such evidence does not vary or contradict the tenns of the note, but establishes
the note never became a binding and fixed obligation. Hanson, 218 P. at 970.
This exception to the parol evidence rule is well established. In Nuttall v.

Berntson, 30 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah 1934), the defendants admitted executing a contract but
argued the contract was not binding because of an oral agreement that the contract
"should not become effective until and unless plaintiff was approved as subcontractor by
the state building commission, and that such approval was never given." (Citations
omitted). The Nuttall court concluded the instrument "does not become effective until the
happening of the event or performance of the act or condition" and "the conditional
delivery may always be shown by parol." Id. at 741 (citation omitted). The Nuttall court
allowed parol evidence because such "goes to the very existence of the contract and tends
to show that no valid and effective contract ever existed." Id.

11
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\\iii

In Utah-Idaho Sugar Co.

l'.

State Tax Commission, 73 P.2d 974, 976-977 (Utah

193 7), "there was an oral agreement made simultaneously with the making of the written
asrreement
to the effect that the written asrreement \Vas merelv., a tentative agreement until
......
'-"

"-

it had been submitted" to a bondholders' committee, which \\'as a "condition precedent."
The Utah-Idaho Sugar court held, '';It is ,,!ell settled in this state that an oral agreement
made prior to or contemporaneous with the execution of a written contract that such
,vritten instrument is delivered on the express agreement that it shall not become effective
except on the happening of a certain contingencf may be shown by oral evidence." Id. at
977 (citing Nuttall, 30 P.2d at 740).
Finally, in F]l1A Fin. C01p. v. Hansen Dai1JJ, Inc., 617 P.2d 327, 329 (Utah 1980),
the court held that the parol evidence rule
should not be applied with any such unreasoning rigidity as to defeat what may be
shown to be the actual purpose and intent of the parties, but should be applied in
the light of reason to serve the ends of justice. It does not preclude proof of
agreements as to collateral matters relating to the contract or its perfonnance, so
long as they are not inconsistent with nor in repudiation of the tenns of the written
agreement. Nor does it prevent proof that a party did not perform an obligation
which it was understood and agreed by the parties was a condition precedent to the
contract becoming effective.
See also Weirton Sav. & Loan Co. v. Cortez, 157 \V. Va. 691,697 (1974) (stating

"delivery of a negotiable instrument may be subject to a condition precedent-the
contemplated completion, ,,rhich is provable as a defense to an action on the note.");
Bassett v. Am. Nat 'I Bank, 145 S.\V.3d 692, 698 (Tex. App. 2004) (stating "parol

evidence may be introduced to show conditional delivery affecting enforceability of a
promissory note"); Farmers & A1erchants State Bank v. Lloyd, 99 Idaho 416,420 (1978)

12
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("Parol evidence is admissible to show such a conditional delivery.") (citations omitted);

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 217 ( 1981) ("Where the parties to a written
agreement agree orally that perfonnance of the agreement is subject to the occurrence of
a stated condition, the agreement is not integrated with respect to the oral condition.").
In the present case, the uncontroverted evidence shows a condition precedent for
Higginson to repay lviorton and thus a conditional delivery of the Demand Note.
vJj

Higginson testified in his second declaration, "The amount that Jim [Morton] had
provided to me in 2006 was always contingent on me selling my Raser stock and making
a large amount of money (as Jim had), and that never happened (and will never happen,
as Raser went bankrupt)." (R. at 277). From the time Morton first wired the money to
Higginson, they discussed the terms of repayment: "I always made it clear to him in our
conversations ( and he agreed) that this money did not need to be paid back unless and
until I was able to sell my Raser stock as set forth above. These conversations occurred
starting in 2006 up until Jim passed away in 2009." (R. at 279). This did not change
between the advent of the Demand Note through the time of Morion's death in May
2009. During this three-and-a-half-year period, Morion and Higginson had verbal and

vJ

email discussions reconfinning this condition precedent for repayment. Yet, in its order
awarding surmnary judgment to the Morton Estate the Trial Court prohibited this parol
evidence (R. at 3 84) ("The Court will not consider parol evidence in light of the
integration clause and the clear language of the Demand Note.").
Further, the condition precedent never occurred. Higginson was never able to sell
his Raser stock and Raser eventually filed bankruptcy. The Morton Estate cannot now
13
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retroactively scrub this failed condition precedent to make the Demand Note enforceable.
However, the Trial Court did this very thing in ignoring parol eYidence of this condition
precedent and mling in its summary judgment order that ti½e Demand Note ,vas
enforceable regardless of conditional delivery. (R. at 384) ("'The Demand Note contains
no reference to any conditions that would excuse repay111ent by Higginson.'} 2 In doing
so, the Trial Court eITed as a matter of Ia,v. Because this parol eYidence of conditional
deliYery is admissible and uncontroYerted, the Trial Cow1' s award of summary judgment
to the Morton Estate on the first cause of action (breach of contract) should be vacated~
and summary judgment entered in favor of Higginson.
C.

Parol E,idence of l\1istake Pro-,ides an Additional Basis for
Invalidating the Demand Note

In addition to nonissuance based on a lack of intent, and nonissuance based on a
conditional delivery, a third defense to the Demand Note is nonissuance based on
mistake. Utah courts have held "'that in the absence of fraud, mistake, or ambiguity parol
evidence is inadmissible to vary or explain the tem1s of a \vritten instrument." Starley v.
Deseret Foods Corp., 74 P .2d 1221, 1224 (Utah 193 8); see also TT1e Cantamar, L.L. C. v.
Champagne, 2006 UT App 321, ~ 39 n.10, 142 P.3d 140 (stating parol evidence may be

admissible to shov{ mutual mistake). In West One Trust Co.

1·. •Morrison,

861 P.2d 1058,

1061 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the court explained this exception to the parol evidence rule:

2

At the NoYember 19, 2015 summary judgment heaiing, the Trial Court stated the "'crux''
of its ruling ••is that there is no evidence in the demand note that there '""·ere conditions
that were predicated .... I find that there is an integrated note, that ifs the entire
agreement between the pai1ies, that it would be inappropriate for the Court to receive
parol evidence .... " (R. at 548:4-9).
14
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Exceptions to the parol evidence rule exist, however, when there is an issue as to
whether the parties intended the writing as an integrated contract, and when 'what
appears to be a complete and binding integrated agreement ... may be voidable
for fraud, duress, mistake or the like, or it may be illegal. Such invalidating causes
need not and commonly do not appear on the face of the writing.' (Citations
omitted).
The Morrison comi concluded, "Therefore, parol evidence may be admissible to show
mutual mistake, occurring 'when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a
misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon whlch they based their
vJ

bargain."' Id. (Citation omitted).
Such a mutual mistake of fact occurred in this case. Higginson declared, "In late
2008, Jim [Morton] told me that he was concerned about tax (I believe it was gift tax)
issues and the money he had wired me, and he asked me to sign a document 'for tax
purposes only,' and told me that I should 'not worry about it."' (R. at 279). Higginson
never intended the Demand Note to be enforceable. Id.
The Trial Court, however, refused to consider parol evidence of a mistake between
Higginson and Morton. (R. at 384) ("The Court will not consider parol evidence in light
of the integration clause and the clear language of the Demand Note."). In doing so, the
~

Trial Court ignored the parol evidence rule exception for mistake. Because this evidence
of mistake is uncontroverted, the Trial Comi's sununary judgment award to the Morton
Estate on the first cause of action (breach of contract) should be vacated, and summary
judgment granted to Higginson.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED \VHE~ IT DISREGARDED THE l'\10RTO~
ESTATE~s NO~-PRESENTl\1ENT OF THE ORIGINAL DE~i.~~D l\OTE
The Demand Note is an instrument governed by Utah's Unifonn Comn1ercial

Code. See U.C.A. § 70A-la-l, et seq. \V11en a party makes a demand on a note, such as
the M011on Estate did in this case~ the party making the demand is required to "'presenC
the original instrument when demanded by the "party obligated to pay the instrument ... ''
U.C.A. § 70A-3- 501(1). The presentment requirement is ,vell established in states
adopting the Lniform Commercial Code, such as utah. There are t\\'O general standards
for presentment - substai1tial compliance and strict compliance ..Although it is unclear
from Utah case law ,,·hich standard applies in Utah, the Morton Estate fails to meet the
presentment requirement under either standard.

A.

Both Strict and Substantial Compliance Standards for the Presentment
Requirement Bar Enforcement of the Demand Note

Regarding the strict compliance standard, "'One manifestation of the strict
compliance rule is the long-standing practice among issuers to require original documents
u11Jess the letter of credit stipulates otherwise." Bisker v. l-lationsBank, 686 A.2d 561, 566
(D.C. App. 1996) (citing Tftestern Int ·1 Forest Prods. v. Shinhan Bank, 860 F.Supp. 151,
154 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). In the present case~ there is no letter of credit or other agreement
stipulating that presentment of the original Demand Note is not required.
"The substantial compliance standard is more liberal than strict compliance and
encompasses seYeral deYiations from it. Therefore, if the documents submitted with a
demand for payment do not meet the substantial compliance standard, they certainly
,,·ould not meet the requirements of strict compliance.'~ Brul v..MidAmerican Bank &
16
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Trust Co., 820 F. Supp. 1311, 1313 (D. Kansas 1993). Some cowts have found

substantial compliance appropriate when language in a demand differs from terms in a
letter of credit in trivial or technical ways. See, e.g., American Colenian Co. v. Intrawest
Bank of Southglenn, 887 F.2d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1989). Even under a substantial

compliance standard, failure to turn over original documents was more than a "de
minimis variance" because presentment of originals "provides some control that the terms

of the [documents] had not been modified when they were photocopied." Brul, 820
F.Supp at 1314.
The Morton Estate attempted to distinguish the above cases by arguing they apply
UCC 5, rather than UCC 3. This is not accurate. Brul specifically cites to Kansas's
version ofUCC 3 (K.S.A. § 84-3-201) regarding the importance of turning over original
notes. Brul, 820 F.Supp at 1314. Similarly, despite addressing UCC 5, the Bisker court
referenced "long-standing practice among issuers to require original documents unless
the letter of credit stipulates otherwise." Bisker, 686 A.2d at 566.
The same concerns exist in the present case. \\Then the Morton Estate demanded
that Higginson pay the Demand Note, Higginson, through his attorney, asked the Morton
Estate to present the original Demand Note. The Morton Estate failed to present the
original Demand Note but instead only produced a copy of the Demand Note. Notably,
the Demand Note contains no waiver of the presentment requirement. Because the
Morton Estate failed to present the original Demand Note as required by U.C.A. § 70A-350 l, summary judgment should have been entered dismissing the Morton Estate's First
Cause of Action for Breach of Contract.
17
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B.

1

The l\1orton Estate~s Countervailing Arguments Are ,,· ithout l\1erit

The Morton Estate anmed
search for the
-- below that it made a reasonablv., dili2:ent
.....
01iginal Demand Note but did not find it. The ~vfonon Estate thus claims it complied ,,~ith

U.C.A. § 70A-3-504(l)(a)'s exception to the presentment requirement (presentment is
excused if the ·'person entitled to present the instrument cannot ,,·ith reasonable diligence
make presentment.~~). However~ the Morton Estate cannot satisfy U.C.A. § 70A-3-309(1)~
which states, "'A person not in possession of an instrument is entitled to enforce the
instrument if: (a) the person was in possession of the insrrument and entitled to enforce it
when loss of possession occurred.~~ (Emphasis added). Because the Mo1ion Estate '"·as
never in possession of the original Demand Note, it cannot invoke the exception in
U.C.A. § 70A-3-504(l)(a).
The Morton Estate also argued below that Higginson' s presentment claim amounts
to a "show-me-the-note" argument, which the Morton Estate claims has been discredited
by Wells Fargo Bank v. Stratton Jensen, LLC, 2012 UT App 40,273 P.3d 383. The
Morton Estate's reliance on Wells Fargo, however, is misplaced. The note in Wells Fargo
was secured by a mortgage (id. at~ 3), ,vhich is not present in the present case. Further,
Wells Fargo relied on the proposition that "Utah law on non-judicial foreclosure contains

no requirement that the beneficiary produce the actual note in order to authorize the
trustee to foreclose on the property secured by the note." Id. (citation omitted). Finally,
the prose appellant in Wells Fargo failed to properly controvert the bank's summary
judgment facts on this issue. Id. at

~

2. The instant case is not premised on a non-judicial

foreclosure, whereas non-judicial foreclosure is a key fact in Wells Fargo and the shm:v18
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me-the-note line of cases. See, e.g., Stein v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 662 F.3d 976, 978
(8th Cir. 2011) ("A 'show me the note' plaintiff typically alleges a foreclosure is invalid
unless the foreclosing entity produces the original note."); Welk v. GAfAC .Mortgage,
LLC, 850 F. Supp. 2d 976, 980 (D. Minn. 2012) (stating the Minnesota Supreme Court
"flatly rejected the core argument made by plaintiffs in this case and in every show-methe-note case: that an entity that holds only legal and record title to the mortgage - and
not equitable title- cannot foreclose." (Citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
Finally, the Morton Estate claims Higginson waived his presentment claim
because he supposedly made promises to the Morton Estate representatives in June 2009
that he would repay the Demand Note. However, Higginson stated in his declaration that
he never promised Morton's children he would pay the Demand Note. (R. at 241-242).
Thus, at the very least, there is a disputed issue of fact on the Morton Estate's waiver
argument.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED ,VHEN IT DISREGARDED THE STATUTE
OF Lll\UTATIONS BAR TO THE 1\1:0RTON ESTATE'S REl\1:AINING
CAUSES OF ACTION

The Morton Estate's remaining causes of action are estoppel, unjust enrichment,
conversion, fraud, and tortious interference. These claims are barred by applicable
statutes of limitations.
A.

The lVI:orton Estate's Promissory Estoppel Claim is Barred by the
Four-Year Statute of Limitations

The Morton Estate's second cause of action is promissory estoppel. "Promissory
estoppel is an equitable claim for relief that compensates a party who has detrimentally
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relied on another~s promise.~' E & H Land, Ltd. r. Farmington City, 2014 UT App 237,

~

29, 336 P .3d 1077 (internal punctuation and citation omitted). The statute of limitations
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(".A.n action may be brought ,,,ithin four years ... for relief not othen,·ise proYided for by

la,,i.'l A "'cause of action accrues·' and the "statutes oflimitations begin ruwing upon
t.½e happening of the last eYent necessary to complete the cause of action.'' Spears

1 ·.

Warr, 2002 UT 24, ~ 33~ 44 P.3d 742 (quotations and citations omitted).
The elements of promissory estoppel are: "( 1) the plaintiff acted with prudence
and in reasonable reliance on a promise made by the defendant; (2) the defendant knew
that the plaintiff had relied on the promise ,,vhich the defendant should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance on the part of the plaintiff or a third person; (3) the
defendant \\'as aware of all material facts; and (4) the plaintiff relied on the promise and
the reliance resulted in a loss to the plaintiff." .Nunley v. TYestates Casing Services, Inc.,
1999 UT 100, ~ 35,989 P.2d 1077 (citation omitted).
In the present case, Higginson allegedly made a promise to I\1orton in January
2006 when the Demand Note ·'originated" (the Demand Note states '"[t]his Note
originated on January 24, 2006'' despite being signed on December 31, 2008). See,
Demand Note in the Appendix. According to the facts asse11ed by the Morton Estate (and
set forth in the Demand Note), Higginson's alleged promise, Morton's reliance thereon,
transfer of the money in question, and Morton's supposed loss occurred on January 24,
2006. Thus, the four year limitations petiod expired in January 2010. Alten1atively,
assuming the above four elements occurred on the date the Demand Note vrns signed,
20
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December 31, 2008, the four year limitations period expired December 31, 2012. The
original Complaint in this matter \\'as filed on October 10, 2014, well after the limitations
period expired on the Demand Note's origination date or the signature date of the
Demand Note.
The Trial Court thus erred in denying Higginson summary judgment on the
:Morton Estate's promissory estoppel claim against Higginson.
B.

The l\1orton Estate's Unjust Enrichment Claim is Barred by the Foury ear Statute of Limitations

The Morton Estate's third cause of action is unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment
requires "( 1) a benefit confeITed on one person by another; (2) an appreciation or
knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention by the
conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the
conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value." Am. Tovvers Ov,m,ers Ass 'n,

Inc. v. CC/Mech., Inc., 930P.2d 1182, 1192 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). The statute
of limitations for equitable claims such as unjust enrichment is four years. U.C.A. § 78B2-3 07 (3). The triggering event for unjust enriclnnent is when the defendant received the
benefit, which would have been when Higginson received the money from 1'1orton.
Morton transfeITed the money to Higginson on January 25, 2006. The original Complaint
was filed October 10, 2014, well after the four-year limitations period expired.
The Trial Court thus erred in denying Higginson summary judgment on the
Morton Estate's promissory estoppel claim against Higginson.
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C.

The l\1orton Estate's Conversion Claim is Barred by the Four-Year
Statute of Limitations, \Vhich the :Morton Estate ~eYer Opposed on
Summary Judgment

The Morton Estate's fourth claim is conversion. ConYersion is ~-an act of \\'illful
interference with a chattel: done without lawful justification by which the person entitled
thereto is deprived of its use and possession."' Fibro Trust, Inc. r. Brahman Fin., Inc.,
1999 UT

1\ ~ 20~ 974 P.2d 288 (citation omitted). A "party alleging c01wersion must

shmv that he or she is entitled to immediate possession of the property at the time of the
alleged conversion." Id. (Citation omitted). The statute of limitations for conversion is
four years. U.C.A. § 78B-2-307(3).
According to the 11orton Estate, Morton \x.ras "entitled to [the Demand Note's]
immediate possession/' after it was signed on December 31, 2008, and Higginson and/or
Morton unlawfully deprived Morton of possession of the original Demand Note. (R. at
60-61). According to the Morton Estate's theory, the statute oflimitations for conversion
started on the date the Demand Note ,vas signed - December 31, 2008. The original
Complaint in this matter was not filed until October 10, 2014, well after the limitations
period expired. The :Morton Estate~ s conversion claim is thus barred as a matter of la\v.
Notably, the :M011on Estate did not contest this issue on summary judgment. (R. at
217-221). NeYertheless, the Trial Court denied Higginson and Burdge's :Motion for

Smm11ary Judgment on this issue: thereby committing reversible e1Tor.

22
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D.

The l\1orton Estate's Fraud Claim is Barred by the Three-Year Statute
of Limitations

The Morton Estate's fifth claim is fraud. A claim of fraud requires "(1) that a
representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material fact (3) whlch was
false and (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly,
knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation,
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it and (6) that the other party,
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was
thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and damage." Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v.

Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 'if 16, 70 P.3d 35 (citation omitted). The statute of limitations for
fraud is three years. U.C.A. § 78B-2-305.
The Morton Estate alleges, "[ o ]n information and belief," that Higginson and
Burdge represented to :Morton (1) "that they would deliver to him the original Demand
Note," and (2) "that the Demand Note they delivered to him was, in fact, the original."
(R. at 62). The Amended Complaint asserts no other allegations of misrepresentation in
support of the alleged fraud.

Any alleged misrepresentation supporting this fraud claim must have been made
prior to the date of the Demand Note, December 31, 2008. Further, Morton had a copy of
the Demand Note in his files prior to his death in i\1ay 2009. (R. at 134). In other vvords,
Higginson and Burdge' s alleged misrepresentation to Morton that the Demand Note was
the original had to have been made during Morton's life. The statute oflimitations for
fraud would have begun when Morton received the copy of the Demand Note in late
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2008 or no later than Morton's death in :May 2009. Regardless of the triggering date, the
original Complaint in tbis matter \:ms filed on October 10~ 2014~ well after the limitations
period expired.
The M011on Estate did not contest this statute of limitations issue before the Trial
Court. 3 The Trial Court thus en-ed in denying Higginson and Burdge's ~1otion for
Summary judgment.

E.

The ~1orton Estate~s Tortious Interference Claim is Barred by the
Four-Year Statute of Limitations

The 1'1orton Estate's sixth claim is tortious interference (asserted against Burdge).
Tortious interference requires the plaintiff to "pro\'e that (1) the defendant intentionally
interfered \\1ith the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper
purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." Walker v. Anderson-

Oliver Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2013 UT App 202, ~ 18, 309 P.3d 267. The statute of
limitations for tmiious interference is four years. U.C.A. § 78B-2-307(3). According to
the Morton Estate, Burdge was "tasked with delivering the original, executed Demand
note to :Morton'' and "'Burdge intentionally interfered \·vith the economic relationship
benveen Higginson and M011on by unlawfully taking possession of the executed, original
Demand Note." (R. at 63).
Even assuming Burdge interfered as alleged by the Morton Estate~ the four-year
statute of limitations for tortious interference vrnuld have been triggered at the latest upon

3

The Morton Estate only opposed statute of limitations claims related to its equitable
claims. (R. at 220).
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Morton's death in May 2009. The original Complaint in this matter was filed on October
10, 2014, well after the limitations period expired.
The Morton Estate did not contest this statute of limitations issue before the Trial
Court. The Trial Court thus eITed in denying Burdge summary judgment on this tmiious
interference claim.
CONCLUSION
v;;

In light of the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Trial Court's award of
summary judgment in favor of the Mmion Estate and denial of summary judgment for
Higginson and Burdge.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of July 2016.
STEPHEN QUESENBERRY, LLC

/s/ Stephen Quesenberry .................. ..
Stephen Quesenberry
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants
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DEMAND NOTE

FOR¥ ALUE RECEIVED, I, Kraig T. Higginson, the undersigned ("Borrower''),
promises to pay to James B. Morton ("Lender"), or hi~ designee~ the sum of Four
Hundred Ninety One Thousand Dollars, together with interest thereon at the rate of five
percent (5%) per annum, compounded annually. The entire unpaid principal and accrued
interest thereon shall become immediately due and payable on demand by the holder
hereof. This Note originated on January 24. 2006 with the accrual of interest

commencing as of said date and ~ntinuing until paid.

··

This Note ·may be prepaid in whole or part at any time _without penalty. All prepayments·
shall be applied first to interest and thereafter to principal.
This instrument constitutes the entire ag,:ccmcnt of the parties and may not be modified

or altered except by an· instrument in writing exoouted by bo_th of the parties.
Borrower agrees to pay 1111 oo~w cill.d expenses, including reasonable attomer~ fees, in
the event of a default under this Note.
·

All payments shall be made a 1786 Millbrook Road, or ¢ such other place as· the holder
hereof may from time to time designate in writing.
·
.
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DATED this _;/_t_ day of December, 2008.
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